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SUPPLEMENT	
	
THE	CURSE	OF	BIGNESS	
Antitrust	in	the	New	Gilded	Age	
	 Tim	Wu†	Columbia	University			
Note	from	the	author:		
This	supplement	is	to	be	read	between	chapters	3	and	4.		
	
An	American	Experiment	in	Central	Planning	
	 	The	cyclical	theory	of	American	history	holds	that	the	country	moves	through	periods	of	greater	and	lesser	regard	for	government	and	private	interests,	which	then	translate	into	periods	of	liberalism	and	conservatism.		There	is	more	than	one	such	theory:	the	best	known	belongs	to	the	father-son	team	of	Arthur	Schlesinger	Sr.	and	Jr.	who	suggested	a	predictable	swing	between	periods	of	a	“public	purpose”	and	“private	interest.”1			Without	embarking	on	a	full	defense	of	cycle	theories,	it	is	hard	to	deny	that	the	public’s	opinion	of	American	big	business	seems	to	go	through	recognizable	peaks	and	valleys.	It	swings	between	a	vision	of	corporate	leaders	as	admirable	captains	whose	conduct	serves	the	national	interest	(as	in	the	1880s,	1920s,	and	1980s)	to	the	contrary	proposition,	that	large	corporations	tend	toward	evil	and	are	run	by	self-serving	barons	(as	in	the	1900s,	1910s,	1930s,	1960s,	and	1970s).			 The	1900s	and	through	the	1930s	witnessed	just	such	dramatic	swings.		During	the	progressive	era,	corporate	leaders	were	decried	as	robber	barons	and	saw	their	reputations	besmirched	and	destroyed,	particularly	during	the	Roosevelt	and	Wilson	administrations.	Yet	by	the	1920s,	under	Coolidge	and	Hoover,	business’s	reputation	was	rehabilitated	and	became	the	beloved	and	glamorous	engine	of	all	things	American.	That	lasted,	of	course,	until	the	Great	Depression,	which	damaged	the	reputation	of	both	the	
                                               
† For assistance with the preparation of this supplement, I thank Ella 
Solovtsova Epstein and Maya Barr Katalan. 1	Arthur	M.	Schlesinger,	Jr.,	The	Cycles	of	American	History	27	(1986)	(explaining	the	cycle	theory	as	“a	continuing	shift	in	national	involvement,	between	public	purpose	and	private	interest.”).			The	elder	Schlesinger	successfully	predicted,	in	1924,	that	the	American	affection	for	business	would	end	in	about	1932.	Id.	at	24.	
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financial	industry	and	big	business	in	a	way	that	many,	at	the	time,	thought	irreparable.				It	may	not	be	surprising	to	hear	that	antitrust	law	and	its	enforcement	has	been	influenced	by	these	cycles,	for	enforcement	of	the	law	amounts	to	an	assertion	of	public	resistance	to	private	power	and	is	aided	by	having	the	force	of	public	opinion	behind	it.			That	is	why,	to	understand	the	story	of	antitrust	during	the	New	Deal,	we	need	to	begin	with	the	period	that	preceded	it.			We	can	return	to	1914,	when	antitrust	law	reached	its	hour	of	greatest	triumph	in	the	election	of	Wilson,	as	advised	by	Brandeis,	and	the	passage	of	two	laws	(the	Clayton	Act	and	the	FTC	Act)	meant	to	strengthen	and	complement	the	Sherman	Act.	Yet	not	too	long	after	those	laws	were	passed,	the	United	States	entered	into	the	War,	after	which	came	the	rehabilitation	of	big	business	under	Coolidge	and	Hoover.	By	consequence,	antitrust	law	had	fallen	into	nearly	as	deep	a	hibernation	by	the	1920s	as	it	had	in	the	1890s	under	President	McKinley.			The	reasons	for	this	were	numerous.	One	was	the	defeat	of	the	movement	that	had	inspired	the	antitrust	laws	in	the	first	place.	Three	presidential	administrations	--	Roosevelt,	Taft	and	Wilson	--	had	collectively	taken	a	run	at	just	about	every	major	trust	in	existence	and	many	of	the	minor	ones	as	well,	from	tobacco	to	canning	to	filmmaking,	and	had	achieved	either	breakups	or	settlements.	J.P.	Morgan,	the	great	monopolizer,	was	dead,	his	fortune	and	control	diminished.	The	Rockefellers	had	mellowed	and	turned	to	philanthropy,	founding,	among	other	institutions,	the	University	of	Chicago,	a	school	whose	influence	over	antitrust	was	still	decades	away.	With	the	greatest	trusts	broken,	there	was	less	of	an	appetite	for	the	breakup	of	“gentleman”	monopolists	--	that	is,	those	without	a	clear	record	of	villainy	and	abuse.					An	indicator	of	how	the	mood	had	shifted	by	the	early	1920s	was	the	treatment	of	the	U.S.	Steel	company,	the	behemoth	which	Morgan	had	created	in	1901	by	buying	out	Andrew	Carnegie.	At	one	point,	U.S.	Steel	was	actually	a	larger	trust	than	Standard	Oil,	and	had	been	a	frequent	target	of	Brandeis’	ire	and	Congressional	threats.	Yet	the	firm,	for	some	unclear	reason,	did	not	attract	an	early	lawsuit	from	Roosevelt	or	Taft.	When	suit	was	finally	filed	in	1911,	near	the	end	of	the	Taft	administration,	U.S.	Steel	had	weakened	considerably	and	was	no	longer	clearly	a	monopoly.	It	had	also	either	mellowed	with	age	or	cleaned	up	its	act.	At	least,	that’s	what	the	Supreme	Court	thought	when	it	announced	that	the	firm	had	“resorted	to	none	of	the	brutalities	or	tyrannies	that	the	cases	illustrate	of	other	combinations	[like	Standard	Oil.]”2	
                                               2	United	States	v.	United	States	Steel	Corp.,	251	U.S.	417,	440-41	(1920)	(summarizing	the	district	court	opinion).	
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	The	Supreme	Court	pardoned	U.S.	Steel	on	the	grounds,	roughly,	that	it	was	a	good	trust,	run	by	gentlemen,	not	hooligans.		Along	the	way,	the	Court	weakened	the	law	considerably	by	announcing	a	principle	that	was	a	tough	pill	to	swallow	for	those,	like	Justice	Harlan,	who	believed	that	monopoly	was	an	evil	unto	itself.		For	the	first	time,	the	Supreme	Court	suggested	that	being	a	monopolistic	giant	wasn’t	by	itself	enough	to	merit	dissolution.	The	Court	put	it	this	way:	“[T]he	law	does	not	make	mere	size	an	offense,	or	the	existence	of	unexerted	power	an	offense.	It,	we	repeat,	requires	overt	acts,	and	trusts	to	its	prohibition	of	them	and	its	power	to	repress	or	punish	them.	It	does	not	compel	competition,	nor	require	all	that	is	possible.”3		That	was	the	1920s.	By	the	early	1930s,	after	the	crash	of	Wall	Street	and	the	onset	of	a	ruinous	depression,	the	affection	for	big	business	had	melted	away.		But	among	many	progressive	thinkers,	the	discussion	had	shifted.		It	was	no	longer	about	reinvigorating	antitrust,	but	centered	on	an	idea	considered	even	more	forward-thinking:	migrating	to	a	centrally	planned,	state-managed	economy.		Known	variously	as	“state	capitalism,”	“planning,”	or	“corporatism,”	the	idea	was	to	migrate	to	a	state-directed	economy	which	would	accept	industry	cartels,	and	even	monopolies,	but	demand	that	they	serve	the	national	interest.		This	was	an	idea	first	promoted	in	the	United	States	by	Theodore	Roosevelt	in	the	1910s	(his	“New	Nationalism)	but	the	thinkers	of	the	1930s	were	more	focused	on	expertise	and	planning	than	he	had	been.		To	prevent	the	mistakes	that	had	led	to	the	Depression,	the	idea	went,	expert	government	planners	would	direct	production	and	pricing.			By	this	theory,	the	small	producers	and	process	of	competition	so	prized	by	antitrust	aficionados	would	be	rendered	unnecessary,	for	everyone	would	now	be	working	together.							With	the	global	economy	in	wreckage,	it	is	not	surprising	that	bold	solutions	were	in	fashion.	Capitalism’s	failings	made	central	planning	and	corporatism	seem	to	many	a	logical	and	perhaps	unavoidable	solution	to	economic	distress.	That	sense	was	amplified	by	glowing	accounts	of	the	success	of	Joseph	Stalin’s	first	“Five	Year	Plan,”	which	was	credited	with	a	massive	increase	in	the	industrial	output	of	the	Soviet	Union	from	1928-1933,	a	time	in	which	capitalism’s	main	economies	were	shrinking.	A	sympathetic	and	influential	correspondent	for	the	New	York	Times,	Walter	Duranty,	lauded	Stalin’s	approach	and	wrote	that	“[t]he	whole	purpose	of	the	plan	is	to	get	the	Russians	going—that	is,	to	make	a	nation	of	eager,	conscious	workers	out	of	a	nation	that	was	a	lump	of	sodden,	driven	
                                               3	Id.	at	451.	
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slaves.”4	Duranty,	unfortunately,	did	the	world	a	disservice	by	neglecting	to	also	report	on	the	mass	famines	created	by	the	plan,	which	may	have	killed	as	many	as	7	million.					If	following	Stalin’s	economic	vision	might	have	seemed	a	bit	much	for	the	average	American,	the	economic	policies	of	Mussolini	in	Italy	were,	to	some	at	least,	an	attractive	and	more	moderate	alternative.	Unlike	Stalin,	Mussolini	had	not	banned	private	ownership,	but	instead	promoted	“economic	dirigisme,”	or	an	economy	directed	by	the	state.	The	Mussolini	government	explicitly	licensed	industry	cartels	and	created	state	banks	to	provide	credit	to	failing	companies.	These	were	attractive	ideas	to	many	in	the	United	States,	where	many	economists	and	businessmen	took	“ruinous	competition”	and	“low	prices”	(deflation)	to	be	the	primary	causes	of	the	economy’s	collapse.	The	cure	was	a	marriage	of	stronger	government	and	stronger	industry,	which,	with	the	agreement	of	organized	labor,	would	do	a	better	job	of	running	the	economy	for	the	collective	good.		What	could	possibly	go	wrong?		The	state	capitalism	craze	of	the	early	1930s	caught	the	ear	of	the	new	President,	Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt,	who	had	been	elected	based	on	a	mandate	that	he’d	“do	something”	about	the	Depression.	To	do	something,	Roosevelt	needed	ideas,	for	which	he	turned	to	his	“brain	trust”	—	a	group	of	thinkers	at	first	mainly	comprised	of	professors	from	Columbia	University,	including	figures	like	Raymond	Moley,	Alford	Berle	and,	most	important	to	our	story,	an	economist	named	Rexford	Tugwell.	Tugwell,	whom	one	critic	called	“the	ideological	philosopher	of	the	Planners,”5	was	a	leading	advocate	for	the	planned	economy,	one	that	would	replace	what	he	called	“the	anarchy	of	the	competitive	system.”6		Let	us	consider	the	case	for	a	planned	economy	as	it	was	made	in	the	early	1930s.	Pure	laissez-faire	capitalism	had	clearly	failed;	everyone	but	Herbert	Hoover	could	agree	on	that.	As	the	planners	saw	it,	a	critical	problem	with	market	economies	was	the	chaotic	mismatch	of	supply	and	demand.	Producers	overestimated	the	demand	for	their	products,	in	part	because	advertising	—	then	a	new	art	—	had	temporarily	enhanced	it.	That	had	led	to	overproduction,	falling	prices	(deflation),	and	failing	industries.	The	better	approach	would	be	to	seek	to	match	supply	and	demand	not	by	a	chaotic	market	process,	but	through	the	exercise	of	centralized	expertise.		Tugwell	proposed	that	the	U.S.	economy	be	overseen	by	a	21-member	National	Economic	Council	which	would	take	on	the	role	of	
                                               4	Walter	Duranty,	Red	Russia	of	Today	Ruled	by	Stalinism,	Not	by	
Communism,	N.Y.	Times,	June	14,	1931,	at	1.		5	Herbert	Hoover,	The	Memoirs	of	Herbert	Hoover:	The	Great	Depression	
1929-1941,	at	388	(1952).	6	Rexford	G.	Tugwell,	Design	for	Government,	48	Pol.	Sci.	Q.	321,	326	(1933).		
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balancing	supply,	demand,	and	prices	across	industries.	The	Council	would	estimate	consumer	demand	for	all	goods	and	coordinate	production	to	meet	demand.	Only	that	way,	Tugwell	said,	could	one	be	“certain	that	the	amount	of	goods	flowing	into	the	markets	is	proportional	to	the	purchasing	power	of	consumers.”7	Using	the	best	available	data,	the	Council	would	also	set	prices	and	prevent	overproduction.	Such	planning,	Tugwell	suggested,	was	necessary	“if	we	are	not	periodically	to	suffer	from	inflation,	wrongly	directed	productive	efforts,	waste	of	capital	resources,	and	consequent	periods	of	stagnation….”8		The	planners	had	another	point,	this	one	more	tied	to	the	process	of	competition	itself:	that	competition	was	not	only	inefficient	but	also	wasteful	and,	in	some	cases,	failed	to	take	advantage	of	economies	of	scale.	Why	should	there	be	10	hotels	along	a	beach	instead	of	one	giant,	more	efficient	hotel?	Or	why,	for	example,	have	two	gas	stations	on	one	corner	when	one	might	do	the	job?				These	examples	might	make	obvious	to	the	reader	that	a	major	challenge	for	economic	planners	is	informational.		It	might	be	true	that,	given	perfect	information	about	everything	(and	perfect	execution)	a	single	centralized	planner	would	outperform	a	decentralized	economy.	The	problem	lies	with	the	assumption	that	it	might	be	practical,	or	even	possible,	for	any	single,	centralized	entity	to	accumulate	all	of	the	necessary	information	and	actually	make	accurate	predictions.9		To	outperform	the	market,	Tugwell’s	National	Economic	Council	would	have	needed	to	estimate	the	right	levels	of	supply	and	demand	for	thousands	of	goods	for	hundreds	of	millions	of	buyers	in	a	complex	and	dynamic	economy.		 As	anyone	who	has	planned	a	large	dinner	party	knows,	planning	is	difficult	even	at	that	scale,	let	alone	at	the	scale	of	an	entire	economy.		And	a	mistake	in	party	planning	is	one	thing;	when	mistakes	are	made	at	the	level	of	a	whole	nation,	the	consequences	can	be	severe	indeed.	In	retrospect,	the	experiments	with	planned	economies	in	the	Soviet	Union,	China,	and	Eastern	European	nations	demonstrated	just	the	power	of	this	informational	problem,	
                                               7	Rexford	G.	Tugwell,	The	Brains	Trust	app.	at	526	(1968).	8	Id.	app	at	525.	9	Fredrick	Hayek	expressed	the	problem	this	way:		
If	we	possess	all	the	relevant	information,	if	we	can	start	out	from	a	given	system	of	preferences	and	if	we	command	complete	knowledge	of	available	means,	the	problem	which	remains	is	purely	one	of	logic.	.	.	.	This,	however,	is	emphatically	not	the	economic	problem	which	society	faces.	.	.	.	[T]he	“data”	from	which	the	economic	calculus	starts	are	never	for	the	whole	society	“given”	to	a	single	mind	which	could	work	out	the	implications,	and	can	never	be	so	given.		F.A.	Hayek,	The	Use	of	Knowledge	in	Society,	35	Am.	Econ.	Rev.	519,	519	(1945).		
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compounded	by	other	problems,	like	deliberate	falsification	of	information	for	propaganda	purposes.		Occasionally,	planners	got	things	right	(a	matter	made	much	of	at	the	time).	But	they	also	made	mistakes,	and	when	they	did,	the	unbuffered	consequences	were	catastrophic.		If	one	were	to	choose	just	one	example	of	how	badly	central	planning	can	fail,	consider	the	Great	Chinese	famine	of	1959-61,	where	a	confluence	of	natural	disasters,	terrible	mistakes	in	the	execution	of	collective	farming,	and	widespread	efforts	to	hide	those	mistakes	led	an	estimated	30	million	to	death	by	starvation.		In	1933,	unaware	of	this	grim	future,	the	Roosevelt	administration	began	to	implement	a	planning	model	for	the	U.S.	economy	with	the	passage	of	a	new	law,	the	National	Industrial	Recovery	Act	of	1933,	and	the	creation	of	a	new	agency,	the	National	Recovery	Administration	(NRA).	Less	extreme	than,	but	similar	to,	the	cartelization	program	in	Mussolini’s	Italy,	this	law	all	but	replaced	antitrust	as	the	system	governing	competition	in	the	United	States.	Here	is	how	the	first	head	of	the	NRA,	General	Hugh	Johnson,	explained	its	goals:	“[T]he	very	heart	of	the	New	Deal	is	the	principle	of	concerted	action	in	industry	and	agriculture	under	government	supervision	looking	to	a	balanced	economy	as	opposed	to	the	murderous	doctrine	of	savage	and	wolfish	competition	and	rugged	individualism,	looking	to	dog-eat-dog	and	devil	take	the	hindmost."10					The	Act	asked	industries	to	do	something	new	and	quite	radical:	to	write	their	own	codes	of	competition,	promising	an	exemption	from	the	antitrust	laws	in	exchange.	They	were	happy	to	oblige,	for	the	law,	in	practice,	allowed	businesses	to	do	what	antitrust	law	forbade:	namely,	to	agree	not	to	compete.			To	be	sure,	the	law	was	not	as	strong	or	coercive	as	similar	efforts	in	Italy	or	Germany.		It	wasn’t	the	Soviet	seizure	of	private	industry	to	serve	the	ends	of	the	state.	Nor	was	it	even	the	nationalization	that	yielded	Crown	Corporations	in	Britain	and	other	countries.	Instead,	it	included	paradoxical	and	conflicting	provisions	designed	to	create	a	new	economic	order	while	still	serving	traditional	American	ideals,	like	the	aid	of	small	business,	thus	somehow	trying	to	promote	both	competition	and	cartelization	at	the	same	time.	But	the	ideology	of	the	Act	remained	fundamentally	corporatist	—	and	as	such	was	in	tension,	if	not	in	direct	conflict,	with	the	very	premises	of	the	antitrust	laws	and	Brandeisian	ideals	of	a	decentralized	economy.	For	here	was	a	program	that	promoted	cartels	or	monopolies	across	the	entire	economy,	aided	and	supervised	by	the	government,	introducing	the	terrifying	possibility	of	the	state	contributing	to	what	Brandeis	saw	as	the	“curse	of	bigness.”				
                                               10	Hugh	Samuel	Johnson,	The	Blue	Eagle	from	Egg	to	Earth	169	(1968).	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3646258
The	Curse	of	Bigness	
 7 
Over	its	two	years	of	operation,	the	NRA	gave	businesses	broad	license	to	set	their	own	prices	and	practices.	More	than	1,000	codes	were	submitted,	exempting	most	of	American	industry	from	antitrust	laws.	In	theory,	the	NRA	discouraged	explicit	price-fixing,	but	allowed	things	like	agreements	on	minimum	pricing,	supply,	and	product	standardization	--	price-fixing	in	all	but	name.		Having	reset	the	basic	rules	of	competition,	Johnson	and	Tugwell	sat	back,	like	farmers	who	had	planted	seeds,	waiting	for	the	results.		Unfortunately,	to	their	surprise	and	disappointment,	nothing	happened.	The	hoped-for	economic	growth	did	not	arrive.	It	needs	some	time,	its	advocates	said,	but	they	waited	--	and	still	nothing	happened.	While	there	is	great	disagreement	as	to	why,	perhaps	the	simplest	explanation	was	that	the	economic	theory	was	wrong.				As	we’ve	said,	the	diagnosis	was	that	prices	were	too	low	and	businesses	thus	had	no	incentive	to	produce	anything.	But	merely	allowing	de	facto	cartels	to	raise	prices	did	not,	in	fact,	stimulate	economic	growth.	Instead,	it	made	things	more	expensive,	which,	given	slumping	wages	and	wide	unemployment,	made	people	buy	less	instead	of	more.	What	the	economy	needed	was	stimulus	—	the	kindling	of	demand,	a	point	made	famous	by	Maynard	Keynes.	Unfortunately,	the	artificially	high	prices	allowed	by	the	NRA	were	the	opposite	of	stimulus.	That	is	why	today,	economists	are	nearly	unanimous	in	their	condemnation	of	the	experiment:	the	harshest	critics	estimate	that	it	may	have	prolonged	the	depression	by	years	and	reduced	GDP	by	some	six	to	11	percent.		The	true	believer	in	central	economic	planning	might	argue	that	the	NRA	wasn’t	given	enough	time	or	wasn’t	forceful	enough.	Perhaps	industry	should	have	been	ordered	to	produce	at	controlled	levels	of	supply	dictated	by	the	government,	and	also	ordered	to	price	at	low	levels,	thereby	spurring	consumption.	Some	of	Tugwell’s	defenders	argue	that	Roosevelt	was	just	too	conservative,	still	too	attached	to	“competition,	small	economic	units,	and	fee	simple	property.”11	But	the	NRA	had	other,	possibly	fatal	administrative	problems.	In	practice,	the	NRA’s	code-drafting	process	was	dominated	by	large	firms	which	used	the	codes	to	set	terms	favorable	to	their	ways	of	doing	business.	That	prompted	smaller	firms	to	ignore	the	codes	—	the	cheating	that	is	typical	of	cartels.	Enforcing	the	codes	was	costly.	By	the	end	of	1933,	just	six	months	after	the	bill's	passage,	the	NRA	had	a	backlog	of	more	than	10,000	code	violations.			The	NRA	also	envisioned	a	new	era	of	peaceful	labor	relations,	hoping	to	facilitate	higher	labor	standards	and	a	new	tolerance	of	unions,	but	big	businesses	resisted	those	dictates	as	well,	as	many	
                                               11	Paul	K.	Conkin,	The	New	Deal	39	(Abraham	S.	Eisenstadt	&	John	Hope	Franklin	eds.,	Harlan	Davidson,	3d	ed.	1992).		
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refused	to	recognize	unions	at	all.	Labor	unions	retaliated	with	strikes.	By	the	end	of	1934,	the	idea	of	cooperation	between	labor,	government,	and	industry	collapsed	into	industrial	warfare	and	actual	violence.	Ultimately,	this	failure	may	have	reflected	the	intransigence	of	industry,	or	perhaps	the	fact	that	the	NRA	was	just	not	as	brutal	as	the	Italian	or	German	regimes	and	hence	was	ineffective	as	an	attempt	at	corporatism.	In	any	event,	in	a	few	years,	it	was	just	a	bureaucratic	mess.		Despite	this	failure,	along	with	far	worse	ones	in	communist	nations,	the	truth	is	that	the	concept	of	centralized	planning	has	never	fully	lost	its	allure.	It	seems	to	have	a	special	appeal	to	a	certain	kind	of	mind,	the	man	determined	to	make	his	mark,	like	Robert	Moses,	New	York	City’s	planner	extraordinaire,	who	proposed	bulldozing	many	of	Manhattan’s	historic	neighborhoods	to	make	way	for	freeways,	so	as	to	connect	New	Jersey	to	Brooklyn.	Resistance	to	those	plans	came	from	a	different	breed	of	progressive	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	like	the	urban	planning	expert	Jane	Jacobs,	or	E.	F.	Schumacher,	who	in	1973	wrote	Small	Is	Beautiful:	Economics	
As	If	People	Mattered.			From	this,	it	should	be	apparent	that	there	is	no	permanent	political	valence	associated	with	centralized	or	decentralized	approaches	to	the	economy.	While	in	theory,	the	First	New	Deal	was	“liberal”	and	the	early	Trust	movement	“conservative,”	we	can	see	that,	in	fact,	they	had	much	in	common.	Both	were	reactions	to	large	economic	shocks	—	the	depressions	of	the	1890s	and	1930s.	Both	took	the	view	that	a	centralized	and	planned	economy	was	superior	to	the	chaos	and	unpredictability	of	competitive	markets.	And	both	saw	progress	in	the	shape	of	beneficent	giants	that	hoped	to	leave	behind	a	more	primitive,	selfish	time	and	enter	a	new	era	marked	by	a	ruling	class	whose	motives	transcended	individuals’	concerns.	The	real	difference	between	the	approaches	lay	in	whom	that	ruling	class	would	consist	of.	The	Trust	movement	saw	them	as	private	planners	of	the	sort	represented	by	Rockefeller	–	industry	tycoons	–	and	Morgan	–	major	bankers.	The	First	New	Deal	put	its	trust	in	enlightened	government	planners.		But	both	movements,	at	some	level,	believed	in	centralized	authority	–	at	an	extreme,	one	that	approached	economic	dictatorship.		 By	1935,	the	American	experiment	in	planning	and	corporatism	was	not	going	very	well	when	the	Supreme	Court	abruptly	struck	down	the	Act	itself	as	unconstitutional.12	The	unanimous	majority	included	Justice	Brandeis	and	other	liberal	members	of	the	Court.	On	the	day	of	the	decision,	Brandeis	gave	the	White	House	a	warning	of	what	was	coming.	“This	is	the	end	of	this	business	of	centralization,”	he	told	a	White	House	aide,	“and	I	want	you	to	go	back	and	tell	the	President	that	we're	not	going	to	let	this	government	centralize	
                                               12	A.L.A.	Schechter	Poultry	Corp.	v.	United	States,	295	U.S.	495	(1935).	
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everything.”13	When	the	decision	came	down,	President	Roosevelt,	shaken,	asked	his	advisors,	“[W]hat	about	old	Isaiah?”	(meaning	Brandeis).	“With	the	majority,”	came	the	answer.14					With	the	NRA	gone,	there	was,	all	at	once,	a	vacuum	left	in	that	rather	key	matter	of	economic	policy	during	depression.		The	Roosevelt	administration	was	suddenly	looking	for	new	ideas	and	new	staff.	As	is	sometimes	the	way	in	American	policy,	having	tried	one	approach	for	a	while,	the	administration	was	happy	to	swing	over	to	its	opposite.			
The	Neo-Brandesians	and	the	Second	New	Deal		 In	the	mid-1930s,	Felix	Frankfurter	was,	officially	at	least,	an	academic,	a	professor	at	Harvard	Law	School,	with	no	position	in	government.	His	status	was	a	matter	of	choice:	offered	the	role	of	Solicitor	General	in	the	new	Roosevelt	administration,	he	had	declined.	Yet	he	was	nonetheless	among	the	most	influential	figures	in	American	policymaking,	especially	economic	policy,	as	a	leading	architect	of	Roosevelt’s	second	(and	lasting)	New	Deal.	Living	full-time	in	Washington	D.C.	and	acting	both	independently	and	through	his	network	of	disciples,	allies	and	mentees	(sometimes	described	as	“Felix’s	happy	hot	dogs”),	he	did	more	than	anyone	to	bring	the	ideas	of	Brandeisian	policy	back	into	the	mainstream.	For	it	was	they	who	resurrected	antitrust	and	its	enforcement	traditions	in	what	was,	at	the	time,	described	as	a	neo-Brandeisian	movement.		Frankfurter’s	connection	to	Brandeis	and	his	ideas	was	more	concrete	than	was	fully	realized	at	the	time.	For	Frankfurter	was,	in	fact,	an	unofficial	agent	of	Justice	Brandeis,	who	was	sequestered	at	the	Court;	Frankfurter	even	accepted	Brandeis’s	financial	support	as	he	carried	out	political	activities.	It	was	thus	that	Brandeis,	through	Frankfurter	and	his	mentees,	was	actively	involved	in	the	unexpected	rebirth	of	antitrust	in	the	late	1930s,	despite	the	rise	of	an	important	rival:	the	“central	planning”	movement	that	was	then	at	the	height	of	its	popularity.					Unlike	the	backers	of	the	First	New	Deal,	the	Brandeis-Frankfurter	school	considered	cartels	an	impediment	to	growth,	and	believed	that	in	most	industries,	it	was	monopolization,	excessive	firm	size	and	the	misfeasance	of	bankers,	not	competition,	that	had	helped	create	the	Depression.	While	sympathetic	to	a	role	for	government	in	helping	the	needy,	the	unemployed,	and	retirees,	Frankfurter’s	followers	were,	in	most	cases,	more	hostile	to	the	idea	of	a	large	federal	government	undertaking	the	centralized	planning	of	the	economy.	As	historian	Ellis	Wayne	Hawley	puts	it,	
                                               13	Arthur	M.	Schlesinger,	Jr.,	The	Age	of	Roosevelt:	The	Politics	of	Upheaval	280	(1960).		14	Eugene	C.	Gerhart,	America’s	Advocate:	Robert	H.	Jackson	99	(1958).		
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	 If	the	philosophy	of	the	Brandeis-Frankfurter	adherents	and	their	allies	could	be	summed	up	in	one	word,	that	word	would	probably	be	“decentralization.”	…	Large,	monopolistic	organizations,	they	held,	were	not	the	result	of	technological	imperatives.		They	grew	instead	from	the	desire	to	avoid	competition,	the	desire	for	promoters'	profits,	and	the	fact	that	“finance”	simply	went	out	and	forcibly	merged	"a	flock	of	little	business	concerns	for	milking	purposes."	…	Competition,	in	other	words,	could	and	should	be	restored	and	maintained.15			The	neo-Brandeisians	thought	that	the	government’s	job	was	“to	recreate	a	system	of	economic	democracy	as	the	basis	for	political	democracy….”16	Echoing	the	criticisms	we’ve	already	made,	they	felt	that	“detailed	economic	planning	in	a	country	as	vast	as	the	United	States	was	simply	incompatible	with	a	democratic	society.”17		 The	Frankfurter-Brandeisians	also	took	a	view	later	associated	with	conservatives	like	Fredrick	Hayek:	that	excessive	concentration	and	monopoly	might	lead	to	a	government	of	dangerous	size	and	power.	Created	to	counterbalance	industrial	giants,	governments	might	instead	form	a	union	with	them,	combining	private	and	public	power.			For	the	neo-Brandesians,	the	First	New	Deal	represented	a	dangerous	flirtation	with	fascism.	In	this,	they	parted	ways	with	Tugwell,	who	believed	that	the	Soviet	economic	model	was	“worthy	of	serious	consideration.”18		The	increasing	acceptance	of	such	views	would	take	the	nation	in	a	direction	different	from	that	of	the	First	New	Deal,	which	is	why	historians	refer	to	the	period	from	1935	onward	as	the	“Second”	New	Deal.	The	full	influence	of	the	neo-Brandeisians	on	economic	policy	is	too	extensive	to	chronicle	here,	but	it	included	the	establishment	of	the	Security	and	Exchange	Commission	in	1934,	the	passage	of	the	Banking	Act	of	1935,	and,	most	importantly	for	our	story,	the	resurrection	of	the	lost	antitrust	enforcement	tradition.	That	came	through	Roosevelt’s	appointment	of	two	men	to	head	the	Justice	Department’s	antitrust	division,	two	men	who	may	set	an	example	for	our	times:		Robert	Jackson	and	Thurman	Arnold.		Robert	Jackson	is	the	better	known	of	the	two,	for	he	would	later	serve	as	a	Supreme	Court	Justice	and	as	the	head	prosecutor	for	the	Nuremberg	war	crime	trials.		Jackson	had,	by	the	time	of	his	
                                               15	Ellis	W.	Hawley,	The	New	Deal	and	the	Problem	of	Monopoly	286-87	(Princeton	Univ.	Press	2015)	(1966).	16	Id.	at	288.		17	Id.	18	Rexford	Tugwell	&	Howard	Hill,	Our	Economic	Society	and	its	Problems	(1934)	521-525.		
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appointment,	already	gained	a	measure	of	national	fame	by	prosecuting	Andrew	Mellon,	the	Pittsburgh	magnate	who	had	served	as	Treasury	Secretary	for	more	than	a	decade	under	Harding,	Coolidge	and	Hoover,	for	tax	evasion.	(Jackson’s	prosecution	led,	among	other	things,	to	Mellon	agreeing	to	build	the	National	Gallery	in	Washington	D.C.	as	a	settlement).		Jackson	was	Roosevelt’s	“legal	ace,”	and	in	1937,	under	the	influence	of	the	neo-Brandeisians,	FDR	appointed	him	to	rehabilitate	the	Justice	Department’s	antitrust	division.19	In	that	role,	Jackson	personally	rebooted	a	moribund	office	that	had	all	but	abandoned	law	enforcement	in	the	age	of	government-licensed	cartels.	As	Jackson	later	recounted,	“It	was	not	until	I	came	into	the	Department	that	the	[planning]	philosophy	was	definitely	abandoned	and	we	reverted	to	the	Woodrow	Wilson	doctrine	that	free	competition	is	the	wisest	and	most	liberal	measure	of	business	regulation.”20				Jackson	fired	up	the	engines	of	prosecution	with	two	major	cases.	The	first	was	a	broad	indictment	of	price-fixing	in	the	oil	industry:	he	charged	24	major	oil	companies	and	46	officers	in	a	criminal	action.21	The	second	was	a	130-count	indictment	of	Alcoa,	the	aluminum	monopolist	and	one	of	the	last	of	the	old	trusts	(and	also	a	firm	closely	associated	with	Andrew	Mellon,	his	bête	noir).	With	suits	against	the	oil	industry	and	the	Aluminum	trust,	Jackson	was	asserting	what	he	called	“a	sovereignty	of	public	over	private	interest	in	business.”22		If	these	two	big	cases	suggested	a	new	vigor,	they	were	merely	a	hint	of	what	was	to	come	next.	For	after	promoting	Jackson	to	Attorney	General	in	1938,	Roosevelt	selected	a	little-known	professor	and	Washington	outsider	to	take	over	antitrust	enforcement.	His	name	was	Thurman	Arnold,	and	the	mark	he	would	leave	on	the	trust-busting	tradition	would,	in	time,	be	comparable	only	to	that	of	Theodore	Roosevelt’s.		Arnold	himself	may	have	seemed	an	unlikely	figure	to	wear	the	trustbuster’s	mantle.	Born	in	small-town	Wyoming,	he	had,	by	the	1930s,	developed	a	reputation	for	being	an	eccentrical	loose	cannon.	
                                               19	Matthew	Stoller,	Goliath	130	(2019).		20	R.	Hewitt	Pate,	Robert	H.	Jackson	at	the	Antitrust	Division,	68	Alb.	L.	Rev.	787,	789-90	(2005)	(quoting	Robert	H.	Jackson,	Draft	Autobiography	86-87	(Box	190,	June-July	1944)	(on	file	in	the	Robert	H.	Jackson	Papers,	Library	of	Congress,	Manuscript	Division)).		21	The	price-fixing	in	question	was	the	system	of	controlling	the	supply	of	oil	that	had	been	explicitly	blessed	by	the	National	Recovery	Act,	which	led	the	industry	to	complain	that	they	were	simply	doing	what	the	government	had	suggested.	Jackson’s	prosecution,	in	that	sense,	established	the	return	to	antitrust	policy.	22	Robert	H.	Jackson,	Should	the	Antitrust	Laws	Be	Revised?,	71	U.S.	L.	Rev.	575,	576	(1937).		
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He	had	the	academic’s	manner	of	disheveled	dress,	carried	a	pipe	at	all	times,	and	liked	to	make	inappropriate	jokes.	He	had	written	a	book,	The	Folklore	of	Capitalism,	that	compared	the	antitrust	laws	to	laws	banning	prostitution	—	in	other	words,	laws	merely	honored	in	the	breach.	One	contemporary	called	him	just	“another	Marx	brother	who	had	strayed	into	the	government	by	mistake.”23	But	all	this	was	not	inconsistent	with	a	fierce,	courageous,	crusading	character	that	could	be	almost	foolhardy	in	its	extremes.					Arnold’s	approach	to	antitrust	enforcement	borrowed	from	criminal	prosecution.	He	favored	what	he	called	“shock	treatment”	—	suing	not	just	one	monopolist,	but	all	the	members	of	an	oligopoly	at	once,	along	with	any	vertical	co-conspirators.	He	would	later	compare	himself	to	a	traffic	officer:	he	thought	it	was	important	to	spell	out,	frequently	and	clearly,	the	rules	of	the	road,	and	thought	that	only	through	arrests	and	punishments	might	a	true	deterrent	effect	be	achieved.	As	law	professor	Spencer	Weber	Waller	writes,	“Arnold	believed	that	the	only	thing	that	would	make	businessmen	behave	was	the	threat	of	indictment.	When	he	brought	a	case,	he	would	indict	the	individual	defendants	and	have	them	fingerprinted	like	ordinary	criminals.”24		Enforcement	and	publicity	went	hand	in	hand	for	Arnold,	who	had	a	taste	for	the	theatrical.	His	strategy,	he	once	said,	was	to	“hit	hard,	hit	everyone	and	hit	them	all	at	once.”25	Soon	after	arriving	in	office,	he	penned	a	lengthy	feature	in	the	New	York	Times	entitled	“An	Inquiry	Into	the	Monopoly	Issue”	wherein	he	described	monopoly	as	both	a	tax	on	society	and	a	threat	to	democracy.	The	monopoly,	he	wrote,	“is	a	dictatorial	power	subject	to	no	public	responsibility,	which	is	the	antithesis	of	our	democratic	tradition.”26		He	promised	the	public	prosecutions	coupled	with	“public	statements	giving	the	reasons	for	[the]	prosecution	policy	in	particular	cases	or	the	reasons	why	the	particular	procedure	was	selected.”27			But	behind	his	trust-busting	theatrics	was	a	macroeconomic	theory	of	how	antitrust	could	fight	the	still-lingering	Depression.	The	First	New	Deal	had	encouraged	price-fixing	and	cartelization,	which	had	done	nothing	to	help	the	moribund	economy	and,	Arnold	believed,	had	left	behind	cartels	and	other	barriers	to	economic	growth.	He	believed	that	if	he	systematically	broke	the	cartels,	prices	
                                               23	Hawley,	supra	note	15,	at	423.		24	Spencer	Weber	Waller,	Thurman	Arnold:	A	Biography	86	(2005).		25	Joseph	Alsop	&	Robert	Kintner,	Trust	Buster:	The	Folklore	of	Thurman	
Arnold,	Saturday	Evening	Post,	Aug.	12,	1939,	at	5.		26	Thurman	Arnold,	An	Inquiry	into	the	Monopoly	Issue,	N.Y.	Times,	Aug.	21,	1938,	§7,	at	1.		27	Thurman	W.	Arnold,	Prosecution	Policy	Under	the	Sherman	Act,	24	A.B.A.	J.	417,	417	(1938).		
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would	fall,	which	would	lead	consumers	to	buy	more,	thereby	increasing	production	incentives	and	generating	more	employment,	which	would	allow	for	more	consumption,	spur	supply,	and	further	increase	employment.	Arnold	saw	his	charge	as	breaking	“bottlenecks	to	business”.28		And	bring	cases	he	did,	unlike	any	other	antitrust	enforcer	before	or	since.	By	1939,	he	had	filed	1,375	complaints	in	213	prosecutions	involving	40	industries,	while	pursuing	185	ongoing	investigations.	His	antitrust	department	grew	to	nearly	600	attorneys.	His	first	success	came	early	on,	in	the	form	of	a	suit	against	the	three	big	car	manufacturers	(GM,	Ford	and	Chrysler)	who	had	forced	dealers	to	use	their	finance	companies	(a	tie,	in	antitrust	terms).		Arnold	reinvigorated	an	attack	on	the	film	industry,	calling	it	“distinctly	un-American,”	as	it	was	organized	with	a	“vertical	cartel	like	the	vertical	cartels	of	Hitler’s	Germany,	Stalin’s	Russia.”29	Arnold's	1938	lawsuit	against	the	film	studios	charged	28	separate	violations	of	the	Sherman	Act	and	demanded	that	the	film	studios	“divorce”	their	theater	holdings.30	He	took	on	the	dairy	industry,	impanelling	a	grand	jury	in	Chicago	and	quickly	bringing	charges	of	a	widespread	conspiracy	to	prop	up	the	price	of	milk	and	keep	out	competitors.		In	an	act	of	particular	courage,	he	filed	suit	against	the	American	Medical	Association,	which	he	charged	with	preventing	competition	among	health	insurance	plans.									Throughout	these	wars,	Arnold	liked	to	publicize	what	he	had	done	for	the	public	good.	For	example,	in	1939,	the	construction	industry	came	in	for	a	“shock	treatment”	—	a	massive	prosecutorial	drive	producing	some	99	criminal	actions	and	22	civil	suits	that,	Arnold	claimed,	saved	the	public	over	$300	million	in	building	costs.	The	frenzy	of	activity	continued	even	into	the	early	days	of	the	war,	until	Arnold	called	it	quits	in	1943.		Even	with	the	war	beginning	in	Europe,	the	agency	filed	another	180	antitrust	cases	between	1939	and	1941.		Did	his	shock	treatment	have	macroeconomic	effects?	It	is	hard,	if	not	impossible,	to	isolate	the	effects	of	antitrust	enforcement	from	other	factors,	but	at	least	some	scholars	believe	that	the	massive	enforcement	campaign	contributed	to	ending	the	Depression.	Einer	Elhaughe	notes	that	prices	really	did	begin	to	drop	across	industries,	and	that	industrial	production	began	growing,	for	the	first	time	in	years,	in	1938,	before	war	spending	had	begun.31	To	be	sure,	there	
                                               28	See	Thurman	W.	Arnold,	The	Bottlenecks	of	Business	(1940).		29	Arnold	Demands	a	Movie	New	Deal,	N.Y.	Times,	Apr.	23,	1940,	at	L19.	30	His	successors	in	office	won	the	case	and	achieved	a	sweeping	reorganization	of	the	American	film	industry	that	ended	the	old	studio	system.	See	United	States	v.	Paramount	Pictures,	Inc.,	334	U.S.	131	(1948).	
31 Einer Elhaughe, Horizontal Shareholding, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1267, 1286-
90 (2016). 
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were	other	factors	and	regulatory	programs	underway,	but	Elhaughe	makes	a	convincing	case	that	Arnold’s	enforcement	campaign	helped	restart	the	engines	of	the	U.S.	economy.	The	fact	was,	with	so	many	economic	cartels	in	existence,	Arnold	had	plenty	of	low-hanging	targets.		If,	in	retrospect,	Roosevelt,	Taft	and	Wilson	had	taken	on	the	monopoly	trusts,	Jackson	and	Arnold’s	greatest	contribution	lay	in	the	defeat	of	the	cartel.	Arnold	wrote	that	“[a]fter	a	period	of	fifty	years	of	only	occasional	enforcement,	violations	of	the	antitrust	laws	have	become	so	common	as	to	cause	no	comment.	Lawyers	in	many	communities	have	been	scarcely	aware	of	their	existence.”32	He	reversed	this	by	systematically	breaking	each	and	every	cartel	in	nearly	every	industry,	and	reestablishing	the	bite	in	the	“per	se,”	or	categorical,	rule	against	price-fixing.			The	antitrust	revivalists	of	the	1930s	and	1940s	also	had	something	to	say	about	monopoly,	and	we	shall	get	to	the	famous	
Alcoa	case	in	a	moment.	But	first,	let	us	turn	briefly	to	a	different	topic	of	tremendous	importance	to	today’s	economy:	the	matter	of	retail,	and	the	effort,	over	the	1930s,	to	save	small	businesses	from	the	arrival	of	national	chains.		
The	Chains,	Small	Retailers	and	the	Robinson-Patman	Act		Well	into	the	1920s	and	1930s,	retail	remained	an	exception	to	the	great	consolidations	of	the	original	Trust	movement.	The	United	States	remained	a	land	of	small	hardware	stores,	grocers,	pharmacies,	and	general	stores,	while	the	“giants”	of	the	industry	were	large	department	stores,	like	Macy’s	of	New	York	or	Marshall	Field’s	of	Chicago,	which	had	a	few	branches	at	most.	As	sociologists	Paul	Ingram	and	Hayagreeva	Rao	write,	“the	independent	retailer	was	a	deeply	institutionalized	element	of	American	economic	and	social	life,	ingrained	in	the	prevailing	concept	of	community,	and	a	key	link	in	the	opportunity	structure	that	was	then	seen	as	a	foundation	of	American	democracy.”33		It	was	the	“chain	store”	that	challenged	and	transformed	American	retail.	Among	the	first	were	J.C.	Penney,	Sears,	and	Woolworths;	perhaps	the	most	aggressive	was	the	grocery	chain	A&P,	short	for	“The	Great	Atlantic	&	Pacific	Tea	Company.”	These	stores	differed	from	department	stores	in	two	respects:	scale	and	standardization.	Whereas	most	retailers	had	been	local,	the	chains	were	regional	in	scope,	sometimes	national,	with	hundreds	and	even	thousands	of	stores	around	the	country,	all	of	which	operated	in	a	
                                               32	Thurman	Arnold,	Antitrust	Law	Enforcement,	Past	and	Future,	7	Law	&	Contemp.	Probs.	5,	12	(1940).			33	Paul	Ingram	&	Hayagreeva	Rao,	Store	Wars:	The	Enactment	and	Repeal	of	
Anti-Chain-Store	Legislation	in	America,	110	Am.	J.	Soc.	446,	447	(2004).		
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similar	fashion.	J.C.	Penney	expanded	from	312	stores	in	1920	to	1452	stores	in	1930;	A&P	reached	over	10,000	stores	by	the	mid-1920s	and	by	1930	was	the	world’s	largest	retailer,	with	16,000	stores	and	some	$2.9	billion	in	sales.			Let	us	turn	for	a	moment	to	the	economics	of	the	chains.	As	businesses,	the	chains	were	far	larger	than	any	of	their	competitors,	including	department	stores.	They	claimed	that	they	were	more	efficient,	based	on	their	“scientific	management”	practices.	But	let	us	focus	on	their	size,	which	gave	them	two	advantages:	volume	and	buying	power.	There	is	an	important	distinction	between	the	two.	A	volume	discount	refers	to	the	fact	that,	as	with	any	larger	retailer,	the	chains	could	seek	a	discount	on	large	orders.	But	beyond	this,	the	chains,	based	on	their	size,	could	also	exercise	buying	power:	that	is,	demand	a	lower	price	not	merely	based	on	the	size	of	the	order,	but	also	on	their	relative	importance	as	buyers.				To	make	this	point	concrete:	most	producers	offer	volume	discounts	because	of	the	certainty	and	reduced	transaction	costs	inherent	in	one	large	order.	As	such,	a	coffee	grower	might	have	costs	of	$1	per	pound	for	processing	a	bulk	order	and	$1.50	for	a	small	order,	and	might	therefore	give	the	volume	buyer	a	price	of	$2	a	pound	instead	of	$3.	But	if	the	larger	buyer	(say,	Starbucks)	represents	enough	of	the	market,	the	buyer	can	demand	that	the	coffee	grower	cut	into	its	own	margin	—	say,	by	selling	it	coffee	for	$1.50	instead	of	$2	—	on	pain	of	losing	Starbucks’	business.		 This	gave	(and	continues	to	give)	the	chains	lower	cost	structures,	which	allowed	them	to	cut	their	prices	and	bill	themselves	as	cheaper	alternatives	to	traditional	stores.	Lower	prices	were	always,	and	will	always	be,	the	calling	card	of	chain	retail	and	large	retail	establishments.		Buying	power	(also	known	as	monopsony	power)	was	the	trademark	economic	issue	created	by	chain	retail.	In	contrast,	the	chains,	even	at	their	height,	rarely	had	a	monopoly	in	sales,	at	least	by	the	usual	definition.	At	the	height	of	the	concerns	over	the	chain	movement,	in	the	early	1930s,	the	chains	collectively	comprised	some	20%	of	retail	sales	and	40%	of	grocery	sales,	which	is	considerable,	but	nowhere	near	the	>90%	monopoly	on	oil	refining	controlled	by	Standard	Oil,	or	the	100%	monopoly	on	virgin	aluminum	enjoyed	by	Alcoa.	Furthermore,	unlike	production	monopolies,	which	tend	to	raise	prices	across	the	economy,	the	chains	tended	to	cut	prices.	But	in	a	different	way,	the	chains	also	wielded	their	power	in	a	way	that	went	beyond	that	of	the	trusts.	The	trusts	held	a	power	that	was	more	distant;	the	chains	reached	into	every	American	town	and	overturned	the	tradition	of	local	ownership	of	main	street	retail.		
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As	you	might	imagine,	chains	were	not	popular	among	existing	retailers,	wholesalers,	and	manufacturers.	They	were	also	resisted	by	local	civic	groups	and	anti-monopolists,	yielding	an	“anti-chain”	movement	that	launched	in	the	1920s	and	gained	considerable	political	power.	By	1929,	there	were	anti-chain	associations	in	some	400	cities;	among	the	prominent	individuals	and	groups	in	opposition	were	a	diverse	mix	of	figures	that	included	populists	like	Huey	Long,	the	future	Supreme	Court	Justice	Hugo	Black,	unions,	agrarians	and	farmers.	That	both	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	and	African-American	groups	were	in	the	anti-chain	movement	gives	a	sense	of	the	breadth	of	the	opposition.		Meanwhile,	the	popular	campaigns	against	the	chains	were,	at	some	level,	fundamentally	different	than	the	anti-trust	campaigns.	Whereas	the	case	against	the	trusts	was	economic,	social	and	broadly	political,	the	case	against	the	chains	was	centered	on	the	ideals	of	localism.	The	movement	was	grounded	in	the	ideals	of	self-rule	by	towns	and	regions,	the	importance	of	protecting	local	businesses	and	communities,	and	a	way	of	life	implied	by	small	retailers.					With	the	anti-chain	movement	came	the	birth	of	“shop	local”	campaigns,	billed	as	a	form	of	resistance	to	the	intrusions	of	“foreign”	chains	which	would	take	local	money	and	send	it	off	to	a	distant	home	office.	Hence,	for	example,	a	southern	campaign	to	“Keep	Ozark	Dollars	in	the	Ozarks.”34	The	fear	was	that	regions	would	lose	not	just	their	economic	life,	but	also	their	identity.	As	one	pamphlet	put	it,	the	chains	were	a	“privilege-seeking	few—[that]	seek	.	.	.	the	dictatorship	of	big	money—a	state	of	financial	feudalism	.	.	.	privilege-seeking	tycoons	.	.	.	would-be	dictators.”35					Here	is	New	Dealer	and	future	Supreme	Court	Justice	Hugo	Black	on	the	subject:	“We	are	rapidly	becoming	a	nation	of	a	few	business	masters	and	many	clerks	and	servants.		The	local	man	and	merchant	is	passing	and	his	community	loses	his	contribution	to	local	affairs	as	an	independent	thinker	and	executive.	A	few	of	these	useful	citizens,	thus	supplanted,	become	clerks	of	the	great	chain	machines,	at	inadequate	salaries,	while	many	enter	the	growing	ranks	of	the	unemployed.”36			The	anti-chain	movement	did	not	limit	itself	to	rhetoric,	but	pursued	laws	designed	to	slow,	if	not	stop,	the	“invasion”	of	the	chains.	As	the	Great	Depression	hit	and	stayed,	hurting	most	businesses	and	bankrupting	many,	the	calls	for	action	became	stronger.	By	the	early	1930s,	numerous	states	had	enacted	anti-
                                               
34 Hayagreeva Rao, Market Rebels: How Activists Make or Break Radical 
Innovations 123 (2009). 35	Id.	at	451	(quoting	Nat.	Assoc.	Retail	Druggists	J.,	Apr.	2,	1938,	at	397).		36	72	CONG.	REC.	1239-40	(1930).		
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chain	taxation	schemes;	the	Supreme	Court,	which	struck	down	so	much	regulation	during	this	period,	upheld	an	Indiana	tax	scheme	that	imposed	increasing	taxes	on	businesses	that	operated	large	numbers	of	stores	in	the	state.	Federal	anti-chain	advocates	pressed	for	a	federal	tax.	Among	the	most	prominent	of	these	was	Wright	Patman,	a	Texas	Congressman	who	made	the	movement	into	his	calling	and	career.		By	the	mid-1930s,	as	the	neo-Brandeisians	gained	power	in	Washington,	the	anti-chain	movement	began	to	borrow	from	the	anti-trust	tradition	by	focusing	on	the	idea	that	the	chains	used	methods	that	amounted	to	unfair	competition.	By	1935,	Wright	Patman	had	opened	Congressional	hearings	into	the	buying	practices	of	the	chains	that	attracted	national	attention,	especially	when	he	revealed	various	predatory	practices	on	the	part	of	A&P,	including	both	“killing	prices”	deliberated	designed	to	destroy	independent	rivals	and	what	was	alleged	to	be	a	system	of	secret	kickbacks	demanded	by	the	chains	from	producers.	The	kickbacks	were	tied	to	the	idea	that	the	chains	used	their	buying	power	to	induce	manufacturers	to	favor	them	and	discriminate	against	smaller	rivals.					It	was	wrong,	Patman	believed,	for	the	chain	to	go	beyond	merely	gaining	volume	discounts	(which	might	be	available	to	all)	and	instead	assert	its	power	and	size	to	demand	discrimination	in	the	form	lower	prices	for	itself	and	higher	prices	for	its	rivals.	It	seemed	to	him	particularly	unfair	when	such	lower	prices	were	disguised	as	rebates	or	advertising	fees.	Men	like	Patman	saw	that	as	nothing	other	than	unfair	competition	—	or	more	precisely,	what	began	to	be	known	as	“price	discrimination.”		The	push	to	ban	price	discrimination,	in	a	Congress	overwhelmingly	on	the	side	of	small	businesses	and	wholesalers,	became	the	Robinson-Patman	Act	of	1936.	As	enacted,	it	banned	two	types	of	price	discrimination.	The	first	was	targeted	at	“killing	prices”	used	by	a	chain	in	one	area	but	not	others.	It	would	now	be	illegal	for	a	chain	to	lower	prices	in	Ann	Arbor,	for	example,	while	keeping	prices	higher	elsewhere	if	the	apparent	goal	was	to	destroy	the	local	competitor.		The	second	and	further-reaching	ban	prevented	wholesalers	from	giving	in	to	demands	for	rebates,	kickbacks,	and	other	discriminatory	pricing	schemes.	Hence,	if	Walmart,	the	giant	retailer,	demands	a	lower	price	on	bicycles	from	a	manufacturer	than	another	sports	store	in	the	same	town	and	the	wholesaler	complies,	the	wholesaler	would	be	in	violation	of	the	Robinson-Patman	Act.	The	Supreme	Court	would	later	make	clear	how	seriously	it	took	this	prohibition,	when	it	found	Morton	Salt	in	violation	of	the	Robinson-Patman	Act	for	offering	a	lower	price	on	salt	for	those	who	bought	over	50,000	cases.	Noting	that	only	five	chain	stores	were	able	to	take	advantage	of	the	lowest	price,	Justice	Black	wrote	that	
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“Congress	considered	it	to	be	an	evil	that	a	large	buyer	could	secure	a	competitive	advantage	over	a	small	buyer	solely	because	of	the	large	buyer's	quantity	purchasing	ability."37		The	Robinson-Patman	Act	and	related	state	laws	had	a	major	effect	on	the	chains	over	the	1930s,	halting	their	further	growth.	The	major	grocery	chains	suffered	a	57%	loss	in	their	stock	value	in	1936,	and	their	share	of	sales,	which	peaked	in	1935,	began	to	decline.			However,	at	the	risk	of	stating	the	obvious,	the	chain	did	not	disappear,	and	in	fact,	in	the	form	of	Wal-Mart,	and	later	Amazon,	the	large,	centralized	retailer	continued	to	gain	strength	from	the	1980s	onward.		So	what	happened?		By	its	letter,	the	Robinson-Patman	Act	would	seem	to	make	illegal	the	business	model	of	firms	like	Walmart,	which	rose	to	prominence	by	exercising	its	buying	power	to	cut	into	the	margins	of	suppliers.	Amazon	does	the	same;	its	suppliers	commonly	complain	of	being	squeezed.			That’s	why	it	must	be	understood	that	the	rise	of	Walmart	and	Amazon	and	the	triumph	of	the	chains	is	a	byproduct	of	the	de	facto	nullification	of	the	Robinson-Patman	Act	that	began	in	the	1980s.			The	law	has	not	been	legally	repealed,	but	rather,	informally	repealed	by	judges	and	enforcers	who	do	not	agree	with	its	economic	philosophy.	That	happened	in	part	in	the	courts,	where	judges	allowed	manufacturers	to	escape	the	scrutiny	of	the	law	through	the	artifice	of	selling	trivially	different	products	to	independent	retailers	and	big	box	stores	(the	latter	at	lower	prices).			The	law	was	also	severely	weakened	by	incorporating	the	requirements	of	other	parts	of	the	antitrust	law,	such	as	proof	of	recoupment	of	monopoly	profit.38	And	finally,	the	Federal	Trade	Commission	has	all	but	abandoned	the	statute,	effecting	a	repeal	by	prosecutorial	discretion.					There	is,	to	be	fair,	a	very	strong	economic	case	against	the	Robinson-Patman	Act	–	namely,	that	it	is	anti-consumer.		Firms	like	Walmart	and	Amazon,	by	squeezing	the	profit	margins	of	suppliers,	make	things	cheaper	for	buyers.	Hence,	if	lower	prices	for	customers	is	to	be	the	goal	of	the	antitrust	laws	writ	large,	the	law	is	counterproductive	in	all	but	very	rare	cases.		The	Robinson-Patman	Act,	critics	charge,	can	also	protect	inefficient	retailers	—	the	local	hardware	store,	say	—	instead	of	allowing	their	replacement	by	larger	and	more	efficient	firms. 
 
                                               37	FTC	v.	Morton	Salt	Co.,	334	U.S.	37,	43	(1948).		38	See	Brooke	Group	Ltd.	v.	Brown	&	Williamson	Tobacco	Corp.,	509	U.S.	209	(1993).	
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A	strong	Robinson-Patman	Act	likely	makes	goods	more	expensive,	but	might	also	protect	local	stores	from	displacement	and	help	regional	economies.			The	real	question	is	whether	Congress	is	allowed	to	make	that	choice:	to	favor	localism	over	efficiency.		And	whether	or	not	you	believe	in	localism,	and	think	smaller	retailers	deserve	such	protections,	the	idea	that	Congress	doesn’t	get	to	choose	is	profoundly	anti-democratic.		 
 This	is	why	it	is	a	mistake	to	view	the	Robinson-Patman	Act	as	an	anti-trust	law,	as	opposed	to	an	anti-chain	law,	designed	to	promote	different	values.			From	that	perspective,	to	say	that	Congress	cannot	level	the	playing	field	for	local	businesses	is	to	take	a	narrow	view	of	economic	efficiency	and	give	it	an	illegitimate	constitutional	status.			For	there	must	be	room,	in	a	democracy,	for	economic	legislation	designed	to	promote	something	other	than	lower	prices	for	consumers.		We	are	consumers,	yes,	but	also	workers,	employees,	producers.	We	do	more	than	buy.	The	squeezing	of	suppliers	and	the	bankrupting	of	rival	retailers	extracts	costs	that	may	not	be	measured	in	terms	of	lower	prices,	but	instead	are	reflected	by	lower	wages,	depressed	regions	of	the	country,	and	so	on.		Surely,	the	law	is	allowed	to	protect	non-economic	values	as	well,	such	the	promotion	of	local	ownership,	a	vibrant	main	street,	and	the	possibility	of	regional	differences	instead	of	homogeneity. 
 That	said,	there	is	room	for	those	who	agree	with	the	goals	of	the	Robinson-Patman	Act	to	question	its	means.		Monitoring	the	pricing	practices	of	wholesalers	may,	in	practice,	be	an	unworkably	difficult	means	of	protecting	local	stores	from	chains.			It	might	be	better	for	regions	to	keep	out	chains	themselves	using	zoning	laws	(as	Vermont	does),	or	to	use	the	tax	code	to	subsidize	small	businesses,	or	find	other	ways	to	help	main	street	against	chains	and	online	retail. 
 This	debate	over	retail	has	not	and	will	not	disappear,	because	it	implicates	values	that	transcend	the	merely	economic.	How	people	buy	things	profoundly	impacts	what	cities	and	towns	look	like,	and	how	much	different	parts	of	the	country	resemble	each	other.	It	has	a	lot	to	do	with	what	Jane	Jacobs	called	the	life	and	death	of	great	American	cities:	changes	to	the	structure	of	retail	help	explain	why	American	cities	and	towns	transform	from	vibrant,	if	crowded,	downtowns,	to	malls	and	strip-malls	and	big	box	stores,	to	today’s	giant	warehouses.	 
 In	our	times,	similarly,	the	trend	toward	online	sales	will	unquestionably	transform	urban	landscapes;	indeed,	it	already	has.	It	may	leave	behind	cities	that	are	mainly	showrooms	for	stuff	to	be	bought	online,	interspersed	with	coffee	shops.	The	impact	on	small	towns	may	be	even	harsher,	as	the	big	box	stores	are	driven	out	of	business	and	retail	ceases	to	employ	people	outside	of	warehouses	
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and	delivery.	And	if	Congress	or	states	have	such	concerns,	they	should	have	the	power	to	act. 	That’s	why	it	is	not	hard	to	imagine	a	new	set	of	rules	designed	to	support	local	or	regional	retailers.	To	express	that	aim	is	not	to	provide	a	clear	means	to	achieve	it.	The	idea	of	policing	every	distribution	agreement	for	pricing	disparities	would	seem	a	daunting	task.	In	some	areas,	government-run	retail,	like	grocery	stores	operated	by	the	town	at	cost,	are	appearing	in	American	towns,	operated	by	locals.	There	may	be	room	for	more	public	ownership	of	local	retail	following	the	model	of	the	Green	Bay	Packers,	the	only	NFL	team	owned	and	operated	by	the	public.	Or,	if	local	retail	is	understood	as	a	public	good,	it	might	be	worth	thinking	differently	about	how	it	is	supported. 
 	In	any	event,	this	remains	a	public	policy	challenge	that	is	ripe	for	fresh	thinking.   But let	us	now	leave	behind	retail	sales	to	return	to	the	1930s,	and	our	pet	topic,	the	treatment	of	monopoly. 
	
Alcoa	and	The	Problem	of	Persistent	Monopoly	
	 The	original	trust-busting	era	of	the	1900s	yielded	an	enforcement	tradition	with	two	main	targets.	The	first	was	the	abusive	trust,	exemplified	by	Standard	Oil.	The	second	was	the	Morgan	Trust	--	that	is,	the	firm	specifically	created	to	monopolize	an	industry.	Yet	still	unanswered	was	the	question	of	how	the	government	should	deal	with	a	different	kind	of	monopolist	—	the	“persistent	trust”:	the	firm	that	dominates	its	industry	for	decades,	but	does	not	have	an	obvious	pile	of	corpses	in	its	backyard.						 Alcoa	would	become	the	test	case	for	persistent	monopoly.	Co-founded	by	Andrew	Mellon,	it	was	one	of	the	few	survivors	of	the	first	wave	of	attacks	on	the	trust.	That’s	not	to	say	it	got	away	unscathed:	in	the	1900s,	its	price-fixing	agreements	with	foreign	cartels	and	exclusive	agreements	with	power	companies	attracted	a	lawsuit	from	the	Taft	administration,	but	Alcoa	settled	in	1912	and	avoided	a	breakup.	By	the	1930s,	it	had,	for	decades,	held	onto	a	persistent	monopoly	in	aluminum	product	markets	—	most	importantly,	“virgin	ingot,”	or	raw	aluminum,	in	which	it	held	a	pure	(100%)	monopoly.					To	say	Alcoa	wasn’t	obviously	abusive	isn’t	to	suggest	that	it	was	universally	loved.	As	Matt	Stoller	highlights	in	Goliath,	Alcoa’s	co-founder,	Andrew	Mellon,	was	a	symbol	of	corporate	villainy.39	Mellon	served	as	Treasury	Secretary	for	Herbert	Hoover	and	had	initiated	widely	unpopular	budget	cuts	that	had	deepened	the	Depression.	He	also	evaded	taxes	while	serving	as	Treasury	Secretary	by	falsely	claiming	to	have	sold	stocks	(at	a	loss)	that	he	
                                               39	Stoller,	supra	note	19,	at	67-73.		
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had	actually	given	to	family	members.	“Alcoa	had	become	the	very	model	of	industrial	concentration,”	George	Smith	writes,	“and	its	principal	owners	had	become	exemplars	of	the	kind	of	corporate	barony	that	seemed	distant,	powerful,	and	dangerous	to	the	popular	mind.”40	Andrew	Mellon,	meanwhile,	was	the	“dour	personification	of	the	political	and	social	bankruptcy	of	corporate	capitalism.”41		The	question	posed	by	the	Alcoa	case	was	a	difficult	one:	what	to	do	about	a	firm	that	dominates	an	industry	for	decades,	enjoys	an	uncontested	monopoly	position,	deters	or	defeats	any	would-be	competitor,	all	without	evidence	of	wrongful	conduct?42	It	is	a	problem	we	continue	to	face	today	in	many	areas.	Many	broadband	providers	seem	to	enjoy	a	local	monopoly.	Is	that	simply	something	that	must	be	accepted	like	a	fact	of	nature,	or	should	something	be	done?	Google	dominates	search	and	search	advertising:		what	of	it?			The	position	of	a	man	like	Justice	John	Marshall	Harlan	was	unequivocal:	if	you	think	of	monopoly	itself	as	a	scourge	and	an	evil,	then	the	law	should	eliminate	all	monopolies,	not	just	those	with	bad	manners.		He	has	been	joined	in	this	view	by	some	economists,	like	Nobel	Laureate	Oliver	Williamson,	who	agree	on	the	economic	merits.	If	monopoly	is	by	its	nature	harmful,	a	tax	on	the	public,	then	who	cares	if	the	monopolist	himself	is	an	angel	or	a	devil?	As	Williamson	once	put	it,	“[The]	persistent	dominance	of	an	industry	by	a	single	firm	is	not	to	be	expected”	and	long-term,	sustained	dominance	“should	be	regarded	as	an	actionable	manifestation	of	market	failure.”43					But	there	has	long	been	resistance	to	action	against	the	“innocent”	monopolist,	or	the	treatment	of	monopoly	itself	as	an	offense.		The	lawyer’s	instinct	rebels	against	punishment	absent	some	wrongful	act,		an	actus	reus.				The	business	person	rebels	against	the	idea	of	punishing	a	firm	for	its	success.			Hence	there	has	long	been	some	line,	reflected	early	on	in	Theodore	Roosevelt’s	distinction	between	the	“good	trusts”	and	the	“bad	trusts,”	with	evildoing,	abuse,	and	public	anger	drawing	the	line.44	Of	course,	these	lines	are	subjective	by	nature:	William	Randolph	Hearst	once	charged	that	the	“good	trusts”	were	“[those]	that	politically	supported	Roosevelt.”45		
                                               40	George	David	Smith,	From	Monopoly	to	Competition:	The	Transformations	
of	Alcoa,	1888-1986,	at	196	(1988).		41	Id.	at	198.		42	Contrary	to	economic	logic,	because	classic	economics	predicts	that	an	undefended	monopolist	will	attract	challengers	seeking	profits	available	to	the	monopolist	and	thus	erode	its	market	power.	43	Oliver	E.	Williamson,	Dominant	Firms	and	the	Monopoly	Problem:	Market	
Failure	Considerations,	85	Harv.	L.	R.	1512,	1514	(1972);	Id.	at	1516.		44	There	was	support	for	both	positions	in	the	history	of	the	Sherman	Act	itself.		45	William	Randolph	Hearst,	Truths	About	the	Trusts	4	(1916).		
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Nonetheless,	there	is	a	powerful	intuitive	appeal	to	the	good	trust/bad	trust	approach.	Many	of	the	firms	that	achieve	monopoly	are,	especially	in	their	early	years,	magnificent	operations,	and	it	may	seem	that	dismantling	them	would	be	more	of	a	tragedy	than	a	victory.			The	judge	might	refuse	to	convict	a	man	absent	wrongful	deeds	or	an	evil	intent.	More	practically,	the	prosecution	of	a	widely	beloved	business	might	be	political	suicide.	Hence	the	instinct	to	draw	some	kind	of	line	that	differentiates	the	bad	monopolies	from	the	good.		Jackson	prompted	a	reexamination	of	the	monopoly	question	when	he	charged	Alcoa	with	130	violations	of	the	Sherman	Act	and	sought	to	dissolve	the	company.	He	served	26	defendants	with	indictments,	including	Andrew	Mellon	himself.	In	a	memo	to	the	Attorney	General,	Jackson	wrote	that	he	believed	that	a	“100	per	cent	monopoly	with	the	absolute	power	to	exclude	others	constitutes	an	illegal	monopoly	per	se	under	Section	2	of	the	Sherman	Act.”46					Alcoa	immediately	protested	that	it	had	done	nothing	wrong.	Calling	itself	the	“most	investigated	company	in	America,”	it	told	the	
New	York	Times	that	it	had	already	been	“cleared…	of	any	charges	of	monopolistic	practices”	(in	the	1912	lawsuit)	and	that	“there	are	no	bars	to	stay	anyone	who	wants	to	engage	in	the	manufacture	of	virgin	aluminum.”47		It	had	not	abused	its	power	over	the	channels	of	commerce	like	Standard	Oil	had,	and	had	never	sought	extraordinary	profits	but	maintained	reasonable	prices.		In	other	words,	Alcoa	thought	itself	innocent	and	was	ready	to	fight	it	out.		There	were,	however,	international	dimensions	to	Alcoa	that	made	it	more	complex	than	the	“innocent	monopolist”	story	might	suggest.	The	government	alleged	that	Alcoa	maintained	its	monopoly	by	virtue	of	world-wide	cartel	that	it	managed	through	its	Canadian	subsidiary,	whose	president,	Edward	K.	Davis,	was	the	brother	of	Alcoa	chairman	Arthur	V.	Davis.	The	Canadian	firm,	for	its	part,	was	part	of	an	open,	and	then-legal	Swiss	cartel,	known	as	the	Alliance	Aluminium	Compagnie,	which	restricted	world	production	and	set	a	global	price.	According	to	the	government,	there	was	a	deal:		in	exchange	for	Alcoa	not	invading	European	and	Japanese	markets,	its	competitors	had	agreed	to	stay	out	of	American	markets,	leaving	Alcoa	unmolested.			The	Alcoa	trial	lasted	for	more	than	five	years,	produced	a	58,000-page	record,	and	ended	with	a	victory	for	Alcoa	in	1941.	The	
                                               46	Pate,	supra	note	20,	at	793	(quoting	Memorandum	for	the	Attorney	General	from	Robert	H.	Jackson,	Assistant	Attorney	General	2	(Mar.	16,	1937)	(on	file	in	the	Library	of	Congress,	Manuscript	Division,	Box	77)).		47	Mellon	Company	is	Sued	as	Aluminum	Monopoly;	Its	Dissolution	is	Sought,	N.Y.	Times,	Apr.	24,	1937,	at	1.		
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trial	judge,	Judge	Caffey,	seemed	to	take	the	case	as	a	question	of	corporate	character:	a	determination	of	Alcoa	was	a	good	trust	or	bad.		He	believed	that	the	government	needed	to	show	something	more	than	“mere”	monopolization,	something	wrongful	or	brutal,	something	more	than	just	a	friendly	cartel	arrangement.	At	trial,	Judge	Caffey	(described	by	TIME	as	“bright-eyed	[and]	scrawny-necked”48)	was	seemingly	charmed	by	Alcoa’s	charismatic	chief	executive,	and	impressed	by	the	number	of	customers	and	competitors	Alcoa	was	able	to	put	on	the	stand	to	“praise[]	its	fairness	as	well	as	its	helpfulness.”49	Maybe	most	importantly,	Caffey	dismissed	the	international	cartel	allegation	by	crediting	denials	by	Alcoa’s	Canadian	President,	whom	he	found	“reliable”	and	“candid.”50	To	his	mind,	Alcoa	was	a	good	company,	run	by	good	men,	and	therefore,	even	if	a	monopolist,	one	of	good	character	and	hence	not	an	illegal	one.	He	announced	his	judgment	by	reading	it	out	in	open	court	over	the	course	of	nine	days.	To	say	that	this	drove	Thurman	Arnold	crazy	would	be	an	understatement.		Arnold	filed	for	an	appeal,	but	just	about	then,	the	Japanese	Navy	bombed	Pearl	Harbor	and	everything	was	put	on	hold	for	the	war.	Over	the	1940s,	Alcoa’s	projected	image	of	a	“good	trust”	was	damaged	by	a	government	investigation	that	accused	Alcoa	and	other	firms	of	complicity	with	German	industry	pre-War,	in	what	critics	called	the	“peace	at	Düsseldorf.”	The	appeal	was	also	complicated	by	the	fact	that	Robert	Jackson,	who	had	brought	the	case,	had	now	joined	the	Supreme	Court,	along	with	three	other	lawyers	who	had	been	at	the	Justice	Department	during	suits	against	Alcoa.51	At	the	time,	the	government	had	the	power	to	appeal	all	antitrust	cases	directly	to	the	Supreme	Court.	In	a	highly	unusual	move,	Congress	authorized	the	most	senior	judges	of	a	lower	court,	the	Second	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals,	to	hear	the	Alcoa	appeal,	and	the	task	of	writing	the	opinion	was	assigned	to	its	most	famous	judge,	Learned	Hand.		Learned	Hand	was,	at	the	time,	surely	the	most	distinguished	jurist	not	on	the	Supreme	Court,	and	his	reputation	as	one	of	the	greatest	judges	of	the	20th	century	has	survived,	if	not	grown.	He	was	a	self-styled	progressive,	and	in	the	1910s	he	backed	Theodore	Roosevelt,	who	by	that	time	had	come	to	believe	in	regulated	monopoly	as	the	ideal	form	of	business.	Hand’s	private	letters	indicated	strong	personal	misgivings	about	the	Alcoa	case,	and	even	perhaps	about	antitrust	itself.	Nonetheless,	he	and	his	fellow	judges	“strove	to	fulfill	what	they	regarded	as	their	duty	to	apply	the	
                                               48	Aluminum:	Judge	Caffey	Says	It’s	Legal,	Time,	Oct.	13,	1941.		49	United	States	v.	Aluminum	Co.	of	Am.,	44	F.Supp.	97,	309	(S.D.N.Y.	1941).		50	Id.	at	282.		51	Stanley	Reed	and	Frank	Murphy	were	in	Roosevelt’s	Justice	Department,	and	Chief	Justice	Harlan	Stone	had	represented	the	United	States	against	Alcoa	in	the	1920s.		
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Sherman	Act	as	they	perceived	Congress	to	have	intended.”52	As	he	wrote	in	an	internal	memo:	“Alcoa	has	had	undisputed	control	of	the	ingot	market	from	the	start;	it	has	kept	it	deliberately	and	indeed	in	the	face	of	some	efforts	to	break	in.	If	we	hold	that	it	is	not	a	monopoly,	deliberately	planned	and	maintained,	everyone…will,	quite	rightly	I	think,	write	us	down	as	asses.”53			Hand	reversed	the	district	court’s	decision	and	authored	a	classic	opinion	that	is	among	the	most	important	in	antitrust	history.54	As	we’ve	seen,	Alcoa’s	defense	was	that	it	had	done	nothing	wrong.	It	argued	that,	even	if	it	held	a	monopoly,	its	prices	were	fair,	and	there	was	no	economic	harm	to	be	seen.	To	this,	Hand	responded	that	“[t]he	[Sherman]	Act	has	wider	purposes…	Many	people	believe	that	possession	of	unchallenged	economic	power	deadens	initiative,	discourages	thrift	and	depresses	energy;	that	immunity	from	competition	is	a	narcotic,	and	rivalry	is	a	stimulant,	to	industrial	progress;	that	the	spur	of	constant	stress	is	necessary	to	counteract	an	inevitable	disposition	to	let	well	enough	alone.”55		This	poetic	sentence,	translated	into	contemporary	economic	language,	stresses	the	dynamic	costs	of	monopoly	--	that	is,	the	deadening	impact	of	monopoly	on	the	economy,	a	matter	distinct	from	the	threat	of	higher	prices.	In	other	words,	the	costs	include	stagnation	and	lack	of	innovation.	Hand	was	suggesting	that	these	economic	ills	—	resulting	necessarily	from	the	mere	fact	of	monopolistic	domination	—	could	be	the	basis	for	legal	action.		Beyond	this	economic	point,	Hand,	returning	to	the	origins	of	the	Sherman	Act,	repeated	that	it	had	political	goals	as	well.	“We	have	been	speaking	only	of	the	economic	reasons	which	forbid	monopoly,”	he	wrote,	“but,	as	we	have	already	implied,	there	are	others,	based	upon	the	belief	that	great	industrial	consolidations	are	inherently	undesirable,	regardless	of	their	economic	results.”56	Among	those	were	“a	desire	to	put	an	end	to	great	aggregations	of	capital	because	of	the	helplessness	of	the	individual	before	them.…	It	is	possible,	because	of	its	indirect	social	or	moral	effect,	to	prefer	a	system	of	small	producers,	each	dependent	for	his	success	upon	his	own	skill	and	character,	to	one	in	which	the	great	mass	of	those	engaged	must	accept	the	direction	of	a	few.”57		
                                               52	Marc	Winerman	&	William	E.	Kovacic,	Learned	Hand,	Alcoa,	and	the	
Reluctant	Application	of	the	Sherman	Act,	79	Antitrust	L.	J.	295,	304	(2013).		53	Id.	at	295-96.		54	He	stated	that	he	personally	did	not	think	the	company	deserved	it,	but	that	it	would	“make	an	ass”	of	the	system	not	to	break	up	a	dominant	monopoly	like	Alcoa.	55	United	States	v.	Aluminum	Co.	of	Am.	(Alcoa),	148	F.2d	416,	427	(2d	Cir.	1945).	56	Id.	at	428.		57	Id.	at	427-28.			
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3646258
The	Curse	of	Bigness	
 25 
Was	Hand	saying	that	every	trust,	then,	was	illegal	—	that	every	monopoly	was	to	be	condemned,	as	Justice	Harlan	had	thought	was	the	real	purpose	of	the	antitrust	law?	Not	quite:	Learned	Hand	sustained	Roosevelt’s	old	division	between	good	trusts	and	bad,	but	described	it	differently.58	As	he	put	it,	“[a]	single	producer	may	be	the	survivor	out	of	a	group	of	active	competitors,	merely	by	virtue	of	his	superior	skill,	foresight	and	industry.…The	successful	competitor,	having	been	urged	to	compete,	must	not	be	turned	upon	when	he	wins.”59		But	if	he	allowed	for	the	idea	of	the	innocent	or	accidental	monopolist,	Hand,	in	Alcoa,	made	sure	it	was	a	narrow	category.	Alcoa	had	kept	its	monopoly	for	decades	and,	Hand	argued,	used	its	size	to	ensure	no	challenger	would	grow	enough	to	challenge	its	dominance.	As	he	wrote,	“[Alcoa’s]	size,	not	only	offered	it	an	‘opportunity	for	abuse,’	but	it	‘utilized'	its	size	for	‘abuse,’	as	can	easily	be	shown...[Alcoa]	insists	that	it	never	excluded	competitors;	but	we	can	think	of	no	more	effective	exclusion	than	progressively	to	embrace	each	new	opportunity	as	it	opened,	and	to	face	every	newcomer	with	new	capacity	already	geared	into	a	great	organization,	having	the	advantage	of	experience,	trade	connections	and	the	elite	of	personnel.”60	Ultimately,	not	to	find	Alcoa	guilty	of	monopolization	would	“emasculate	the	Act;	would	permit	just	such	consolidations	as	it	was	designed	to	prevent.”61	62		With	Alcoa,	the	big	case	tradition	took	a	new	step:	sustaining	monopoly	(here	coupled	with	entering	into	a	foreign	cartel	agreement)	was	now	a	violation	of	the	Sherman	Act.	This	view	is	very	similar	to	the	view	that	takes	monopoly,	by	itself,	as	a	plague	on	the	competitive	economy.	The	judicial	elaboration	of	this	view	reached	its	fullest	extent	in	the	hands	of	district	Judge	Wyzanski	in	the	mid-1960s.	As	he	wrote,	“More	than	seven	decades	of	Sherman	Act	enforcement	leave	the	informed	observer	with	the	abiding	conviction	that	durable	non-statutory	monopolies	…	are,	to	a	moral	certainty,	due	to	acquisitions	of	competitors	or	restraints	of	trade.”63	
                                               58	At	some	level,	Hand	was	compelled	to	follow	the	holding	of	U.S.	Steel,	which	had	insisted	that	holding	size	and	power	alone	was	not	an	offense	and	that	there	needed	to	be	anticompetitive	conduct	to	prove	a	violation	of	the	Sherman	Act.	59	Id.	at	430.		60	Id.	at	430-31.		61	Id.	at	431.		62	While	the	government	won	the	case	against	Alcoa,	it	technically	did	not	break	up	the	company,	for	things	had	changed	dramatically	by	the	end	of	the	litigation.		By	the	end	of	the	war,	the	government	itself	had	built	its	own	aluminum	production	capacities	that	amounted	to	two	thirds	of	national	production,	and	competition	in	the	market	was	achieved	by	selling	wartime	aluminum	assets	to	Alcoa’s	competitors.				63	United	States	v.	Grinnell	Corp.,	236	F.Supp	244,	248	(D.R.I.	1964).		
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They	are,	he	wrote,	“the	achievement	of	the	quiet	life	after	the	enemy's	capitulation	or	his	defeat	in	inglorious	battle.64			*	*	*		The	World	War	was	now	over,	the	United	States	was	at	the	peak	of	its	power	and	confidence,	and	support	for	the	antitrust	movement	was	at	perhaps	an	all-time	high.	That	reflected	not	just	resistance	to	American	big	business,	but	the	sense	that	a	horrible	lesson	in	the	dangers	of	monopoly	had	been	taught	by	the	Third	Reich	and	the	Japanese	Empire.			It	is	to	those	lessons	that	we	now	turn.				
                                               64	Id.		The	Supreme	Court,	affirming	the	decision,	did	not	endorse	the	presumption.		Instead,	it	stated	the	following,	more	ambiguous	standard:		The	offense	of	monopoly	under	§	2	of	the	Sherman	Act	has	two	elements:	(1)	the	possession	of	monopoly	power	in	the	relevant	market	and	(2)	the	willful	acquisition	or	maintenance	of	that	power	as	distinguished	from	growth	or	development	as	a	consequence	of	a	superior	product,	business	acumen,	or	historic	accident.		United	States	v.	Grinnell	Corp.,	384	U.S.	563,	570-71	(1966).	
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